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Several antitrust cases were before the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals during its 1977 session.' This article disses the more signifi-
cant of these decisions.2 It does so from a purposefully pragmatic stand-
point: the needs of the practicing attorney. With these needs in mind, the
article does not attempt to canvass all possible ramifications of each particu-
lar case, nor does it seek to offer sophisticated suggestions as to how the law
might be improved. Rather, the article addresses itself to the following three
basic questions for each of the decisions discussed: What are the key facts of
the case? What did the court decide? How is the decision significant to
antitrust practitioners in planning transactions for their clients? It is our hope
that practitioners will find our answers to these questions helpful in making
more effective use of antitrust law as it now stands in the Seventh Circuit.
BEA TRICE FOODS Co. v. F.T. C.
DEFINING A "RELEVANT
PRODUCT MARKET" FOR MERGER AND MONOPOLIZATION CASES
Few antitrust issues are more perplexing or frustrating than the problem
of defining a "relevant product market" for the purposes of deciding a
* Staff attorney, Federal Trade Commission; J.D., Harvard University; member, Il-
linois and California Bars.
** Staff attorney, Federal Trade Commission; J.D., Northwestern University.
The authors would like to express their deep appreciation to Mr. Jerome Lamet, Assistant
Regional Director of the Chicago Regional Office of the Federal Trade Commission, for his
extremely helpful suggestions in the preparation of this article. The authors also wish to make it
clear that the opinions expressed in this article are their own, and do not necessarily represent
the views of the Federal Trade Commission.
i. The article discusses decisions published by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
between the fall of 1976 and the summer of 1977.
2. Other decisions that will not be discussed in this article include the following: F.T.C.
v. Miller, 549 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1977) (the common carrier exemption to the FI'C Act not only
precludes the IFTC from investigating a common carrier but also bars it from subpoenaing the
common carrier, even though the result is a regulatory gap); Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v.
Church & Dwight Co., 560 F.2d 1325 (7th Cir. 1977) (a district court does not abuse its
discretion in severing antitrust affirmative defenses and counterclaims raised by the defendant
in a trademark infringement action, and in staying discovery on the antitrust issues, pending
resolution of the trademark infringement claim, where the antitrust issues are remote and
unrelated to the trademark infringement issues and where the alleged antitrust violations are on
their face of questionable legal sufficiency); United States v. Michigan Carton Co., 552 F.2d
198 (7th Cir. 1977) (where a corporate defendant in a criminal antitrust action is merged into a
second corporation during the pendency of the grand jury that indicts the merged corporation,
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monopolization or a merger case. The latest attempt by the Seventh Circuit
to resolve this difficult issue is Beatrice Foods Co. v. F. T. C. 3
Beatrice Foods has long been a leading producer of food products.
During recent years, Beatrice has also diversified into several non-food
lines. One such diversification was Beatrice's 1969 acquisition of all of the
stock of Tip Top Brush Company. At the time, Tip Top was the nation's
third largest producer of combined paint brushes and paint rollers, and the
fifth largest producer of paint rollers. Beatrice itself was neither a producer
of paint brushes nor a producer of paint rollers.
The following year, 1970, Beatrice additionally acquired substantially
all of the assets of Essex Graham Company. Essex, unlike Tip Top, did not
produce paint brushes. However, Essex was the nation's eighth largest
producer of paint rollers and the thirteenth largest firm in the combined
"paint brush and roller" market.
The Federal Trade Commission issued a complaint challenging both
acquisitions under section 7 of the Clayton Act.4 In relevant part, it was
alleged that the Tip Top acquisition had an anticompetitive effect by
eliminating Beatrice itself as a "potential entrant" into the paint brush and
roller industry.5 The Essex acquisition was challenged on the dual grounds
that actual competition between Tip Top and Essex in the production of
paint rollers had been eliminated, and that Essex had been eliminated as a
potential competitor in the production of paint brushes.
6
The Federal Trade Commission,7 following an extensive administrative
hearing, adopted the administrative law judge's determination that it had not
been proven by either "subjective" or "objective" evidence that Beatrice
was a "potential entrant" into the paint brush and roller industry.' As a
and the survivor corporation enters a plea of nolo contendere on behalf of the merged
corporation, any error in naming the merged rather than the survivor corporation in the
indictment is waived by entry of the plea of nolo contendere); Fox Valley Harvestore, Inc. v.
A.O. Smith Harvestore Prod., Inc., 545 F.2d 1096 (7th Cir. 1976) (a district court does not abuse
its discretion in denying a preliminary injunction to a terminated distributor where the dis-
tributor brings an antitrust action after its distributorship has been terminated, making the
termination non-retaliatory, and where the distributor has not shown an inability to finance its
litigation); Richard's Lumber & Supply Co. v. United States Gypsum Co., 545 F.2d 18 (7th Cir.
1976), cert. denied sub nom. Richard's Lumber & Supply Co. v. Kaufman & Broad Homes,
Inc., 97 S. Ct. 1326 (1977) (a covenant not to sue contained in the settlement of an antitrust class
action bars later suit by one of the members of the class where the class member received notice
of the settlement, including the covenant, and the class was adequately represented).
3. 540 F.2d 303 (7th Cir. 1976), aff'g 86 F.T.C. 1 (1975).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
5. 540 F.2d 303, 306 (7th Cir. 1976).
6. Id.
7. Hereinafter referred to in the text and footnotes as the Commission.
8. 86 F.T.C. 1, 65. The administrative law judge's discussion of the "potential competi-
tion" issue is well worth reviewing for those practitioners faced with a similar issue. See id. at
38-41. See also Dunfee & Stern, Potential Competition Theory as an Antimerger Tool Under
Section 7 of the Clayton Act: A Decision Model, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 821 (1975).
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result, Beatrice's acquisition of Tip Top was upheld. The Essex acquisition,
however, was held to be unlawful since it eliminated both actual competi-
tion (paint rollers) and potential competition (paint brushes) between Tip
Top and Essex in an industry that already showed a marked trend towards
concentration. 9
Beatrice appealed the Commission's decision to the Seventh Circuit,
alleging several arguments for reversal. Only two of these arguments will,
however, be discussed in this article. First, Beatrice argued that the
Commission had erred in including paint brushes and rollers within the
"relevant product market" while excluding aerosols and paint spraying
equipment. Second, Beatrice contended that the relevant product market
should, in any event, have been divided into two "submarkets": "profes-
sional use" and "do-it-yourself use." The court's treatment of these two
arguments is discussed in depth in the sections which follow.
The Relevant Product Market
Before turning specifically to the Beatrice decision, it would be helpful
to digress for a moment and quickly review the leading legal principles that
govern how to define a "relevant product market." Undoubtedly, the most
frequently cited language on this subject is taken from the Supreme Court's
leading decision of Brown Shoe Co. v. United States:
The outer boundaries of a product market are determined by the
reasonable interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity of de-
mand between the product itself and substitutes for it. . .. . How-
ever, within this broad market, well-defined submarkets may exist
which, in themselves, constitute product markets for antitrust
purposes. United States v. E.L du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353
U.S. 586, 593-595. The boundaries of such a submarket may be
determined by examining such practical indicia as industry or
public recognition of the submarket as a separate economic entity,
the product's peculiar characteristics and uses, unique production
facilities, distinct customers, distinct prices, sensitivity to price
changes, and specialized vendors. . ..
In Brown Shoe, the Supreme Court applied these "practical indicia"
to hold that men's, women's and children's shoes were each "relevant
submarkets" for purposes of measuring the anticompetitive effects of a shoe
manufacturer's acquisition of a chain of retail shoe outlets."1 The Supreme
9. During the period from 1967 through 1969, the top four firm concentration in the
brush-and-roller market rose from 36.6% to 41.3%, while the top eight firm concentration rose
from 52.8% to 62.5%. 540 F.2d at 306 n.3.
10. 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). For a general discussion
of the "relevant market" issue, see Almstedt, Relevant Market: The Anlage of Proving an
Attempt to Monopolize, 28 J. Mo. B. 282 (1972); Hale & Hale, A Line of Commerce: Market
Definition in Anti-Merger Cases, 52 IowA L. REV. 406 (1966).
11. Specifically, the Supreme Court reasoned that the public itself recognized this distinc-
tion ("industry or public recognition"), that each of the shoe lines had "characteristics peculiar
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Court refused, however, to futher extend this reasoning to draw "price/
equality" and "age/sex" distinctions between different shoes within each of
the three shoe lines. The Court conceded that some of its "practical indicia"
would have supported such further distinctions, but concluded that under the
circumstances of the case, these additional distinctions would have been
"unrealistic" and "impractical." ' 12
Brown Shoe, like Beatrice, was a case brought under section 7 of the
Clayton Act. Nevertheless, the same concepts developed in Brown Shoe
and its progeny have been applied in recent monopolization cases brought
under section 2 of the Sherman Act.13 This "blending" of monopolization
and merger cases for purposes of market definition is reflected in recent
decisions of the Seventh Circuit itself.14 While the Supreme Court, as
opposed to lower courts such as the Seventh Circuit, has not yet expressly
upheld the application of Brown Shoe to monopolization as well as merger
cases, it certainly seems to have placed its stamp of approval on this line of
analysis. 
15
Beatrice is the Seventh Circuit's most recent decision in the complex
area of market definition. In Beatrice, the Seventh Circuit followed the
analytical approach established in its earlier comparable decisions.' 6 It first
paraphrased the "practical indicia" suggested in Brown Shoe for determin-
ing the "boundaries of a submarket": "These indicia are (1) the industry or
public recognition of the submarket as a separate economic entity, (2) the
product's peculiar characteristics and uses, (3) unique production facilities,
(4) distinct customers, (5) distinct prices, (6) sensitivity to price changes,
to itself" that made it unfit for use in the other shoe lines, that "separate plants" were used for
the manufacture of each, and that -each was directed towards a "distinct class of customers."
370 U.S. at 326-28.
12. Id.
13. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. IV 1974). See, e.g., Hudson Valley Asbestos Corp. v. Tougher
Heating & Plumbing Co., 510 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975); Case-
Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 369 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 389
U.S. 384 (1968); Credit Bur. Reports, Inc. v. Retail Credit Co., 358 F. Supp. 780 (S.D. Tex.
1971), aff'd, 478 F.2d 1402 (5th Cir. 1973).
14. See, e.g., L.G. Balfour Co. v. F.T.C., 442 F.2d 1, 11 (7th Cir. 1971), aff'g 74 F.T.C.
345 (1968) (a monopolization case applying Brown Shoe); Cass Student Advertising, Inc. v.
National Educ. Advertising Serv., Inc., 516 F.2d 1092 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 986
(1975)(a monopolization case applying Brown Shoe); American Aloe Corp. v. Aloe Creme
Laboratories, Inc., 420 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 929 (1970) (a monopolization
case applying Brown Shoe); Avnet, Inc. v. F.T.C., 511 F.2d 70 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
833 (1975) (a merger case applying Brown Shoe).
15. The Supreme Court stated, in dictum, in United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563,
572 (1966) that "[i]n § 2 cases under the Sherman Act, as in § 7 cases under the Clayton Act
(Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962)) there may be submarkets that are
separate economic entities." With specific references to the use in monopolization cases of
market definition concepts developed in merger cases, and vice versa, the Court reasoned:
"We see no reason to differentiate between 'line' of commerce in the context of the Clayton
Act and 'part' of commerce for purposes of the Sherman Act." 384 U.S. at 573.
16. See cases cited at note 14 supra.
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and (7) specialized vendors."' 17 The court then applied these market indi-
cators to the first of the issues raised in Beatrice, i.e. , whether the Commis-
sion justifiably excluded aerosols and spray equipment in defining the
relevant product market to include only paint brushes and rollers. The court,
in upholding the Commission's determination, pointed to the following
findings of the administrative law judge which, if considered within the
framework Brown Shoe test, constitute the "practical indicia" outlined in
that case for determining the "boundaries of a submarket:"
First, the Bureau of Census categorizes brushes and rollers in a five-
digit S.I.C. 18 category separate from aerosols and spray equipment, and
aerosol manufacturers regard themselves as a separate industry ("industry
or public recognition"). 19
Second, paint brushes and rollers are generally manufactured and
distributed by the same firms to the same buyers, while aerosols and spray
equipment are manufactured and sold by different manufacturers utilizing
technology, machinery and raw materials substantially different from those
used to produce brushes and rollers ("product's peculiar characteristics and
uses," "unique production facilities," and "specialized vendors").2'
Third, rollers are far more interchangeable in use with brushes than are
aerosols or spray equipment ("product's peculiar characteristics and uses"
and "distinct customers"). 2'
Fourth, the prices and cost of using brushes and rollers are distinctly
lower than those for aerosols or spray equipment ("distinct prices").22
Fifth, brush and roller manufacturers do not consider the prices of
aerosols or spray equipment when setting their prices ("sensitivity to price
changes").23 Based on these factors, the Seventh Circuit concluded that
"the Commission clearly could determine that brushes and rollers
constituted a relevant product market.' 24
Beatrice is a mechanically correct application of the market guidelines
suggested by the Supreme Court in Brown Shoe. The decision would,
however, have been far clearer if the Seventh Circuit had specifically
addressed itself to the question of the significance of these "practical
indicia." A similar criticism can be leveled at the court's other recent
market definition cases. 25 These decisions, like Beatrice, employ a mechan-
17. 540 F.2d at 308.




22. Id. at 308-09.
23. Id. at 309.
24. Id.
25. See note 14 supra.
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ical application of the Brown Shoe market indicators without really ex-
plaining why these indicators are competitively significant in the particular
markets involved.
Ultimately, the purpose of the Brown Shoe market guidelines is simply
to help define that area of goods or services in which the particular product
or service in question effectively competes.2 6 If there is no effective actual
or prospective competition between the particular product in question and
some other product, then the latter product is to be excluded from the
relevant market. Since the ultimate test is thus one of "effective actual or
prospective competition," the Seventh Circuit could have greatly clarified
its reasoning in Beatrice by making several findings. First, since the
equipment, raw materials and technology for producing aerosols and spray
equipment differ markedly from those for brushes and rollers, there exist
competitive barriers to the conversion of sprayer or aerosol manufacture to
brush or roller manufacture-a barrier to "effective prospective competi-
tion" by manufacturers of aerosol and spray equipment. Secondly, since
aerosols and sprayers are far less interchangeable in use with brushes than
are rollers, and are far more costly to use than either brushes or rollers, there
exist competitive barriers to the consumer's use of sprayers or aerosols in
place of brushes or rollers-a barrier to "effective actual competition" by
aerosols and sprayers. And, lastly, the fact that brush and roller manufactur-
ers do not consider aerosol or sprayer prices when setting their prices, while
aerosol manufacturers actually consider themselves to be a separate indus-
try, very directly shows that aerosols and spray equipment are not in
"effective actual or prospective competition" with brushes and rollers.
Certainly, these conclusions are implicit in Beatrice. Nevertheless, the
decision would have been far clearer if the Seventh Circuit had taken the
additional step of expressly spelling them out, rather than simply paraphras-
ing and then mechanically applying the Brown Shoe guidelines.
"Professional" and "Do-It-Yourself" Submarkets
A similar criticism can be directed at the court's treatment of the
second issue presented in Beatrice, i.e., whether the Commission erred in
failing to divide the brush and roller market into separate "professional"
and "do-it-yourself" submarkets, due to price and quality distinctions
between the two. The issue was a key one, since, as Beatrice argued, Tip
Top manufactured inexpensive, low-quality brushes that would have fallen
within the "do-it-yourself" submarket, while Essex manufactured higher-
26. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956); Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 299 n.5 (1949) (defining the relevant market to be that "area
of effective competition" within which defendants operate).
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priced, higher-quality rollers that would have come within the "profession-
al" submarket, thereby removing the element of actual competition between
the two.
The Seventh Circuit began its analysis of this second issue by first
stating:
Prior cases indicate that price/quality distinctions in products
may play a role in market definitions where articles are sold in
clearly separate price groupings that have little or no price sen-
sitivity between them. See, e.g., Avnet, Inc. v. FTC, 511 F.2d 70
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 833, 96 S.Ct. 56, 46 L.Ed.2d 51
(1975). Price differentials may also be significant when they are
clearly indicative of such quality distinctions that articles of dif-
ferent prices are not interchangeable for particular purposes. See,
e.g., A.G. Spalding & Bros., Inc. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 585 (3d Cir.
1962).27
The court felt that Beatrice did not present such a fact situation. To the
contrary, the record showed "substantial price overlap" and "price interac-
tion" between "professional" and "do-it-yourself" materials. 28 In addi-
tion, the record failed to show that "professional" materials were especially
suitable for particular "uses" for which "do-it-yourself" materials were
"unacceptable. ',29 The court bolstered this analysis by further noting that
both types of materials are distributed through the same outlets to the "same
customers." 30 Without further elaboration, the court summarily concluded
that the "professional" and "do-it-yourself" distinction therefore had to be
rejected as "unrealistic," citing Brown Shoe.3t
The court's treatment of the "professional" versus "do-it-yourself"
distinction contains an unfortunate ambiguity that could prove troublesome
to practitioners in the future. As already noted, 32 the court started its
analysis by citing its earlier Avnet decision for the proposition that market
lines may be drawn between "clearly separate price groupings that have
27. 540 F.2d at 309. In Avnet, the Seventh Circuit upheld a market definition that included
new automotive electrical units but excluded rebuilt or reconditioned used units, arguing that
the following two factors supported such a distinction: "prices for rebuilt or reconditioned used
components varied from 25% to 50% below the prices for comparable new items;" and "the
absence of any substantial interaction in price between the two lines." 511 F.2d at 77. In
Spalding (a merger case), the Third Circuit upheld a market definition that included higher-
priced, higher-quality athletic goods but excluded low-priced athletic goods, where the higher-
priced goods were superior in quality and raw materials and were particularly suitable for use in
organized competition. 301 F.2d at 603.
28. 540 F.2d at 310.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 310. See text accompanying note II supra.
32. See text accompanying note 27 supra.
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little or no price sensitivity between them." 33 This "distinct prices/price
insensitivity" approach does, indeed, seem to be the one that the court
adopted in Avnet itself.34 However, when the court went on to discuss the
actual facts of Beatrice, it described Avnet as presenting "clearly separate
price groupings based on quality distinctions." 35 The addition of the em-
phasized words is unfortunate, since they suggest that perhaps "distinct
prices" and "price insensitivity" are not enough; perhaps "quality distinc-
tions" must also be present, regardless of how strong the showing of price
discrepancy and price insensitivity may be. It is doubtful, however, that this
was the inference that the Seventh Circuit intended. Rather, it is assumed
that the court simply meant to say that "professional" and "do-it-yourself"
brushes and rollers are in "effective actual competition" with one another,
and should therefore be included within the same relevant market, since
there is substantial price overlap and price interaction between the two,
"professional" items can be readily put to the same use as "do-it-yourself"
items, and both are marketed and sold through the same outlets to the same
ultimate customers. Viewed in this light, the court's conclusion is both
mechanically and logically sound.
Significance of Beatrice to Antitrust Practitioners
Beatrice suggests five possible factors for practitioners to consider
when advising clients on the wisdom of a particular horizontal merger or
acquisition. 36 The first three of these factors go to the question of product
market definition, while the last two go to the question of how the merger or
acquisition is likely to be viewed by the courts or the government in the
event of a legal challenge.
First, how does the consumer view the particular products in question?
Does the consumer, for example, view the products as being distinct
because of actual physical differences between them, differences in the uses
to which they are or can be put, or differences in the actual methods or cost
of using them? Are these differences reflected in the consumer's response to
price differences between the products? In particular, when the price of one
is changed, does this affect the consumer's purchases of the other product?
Considerations of this type go to the question of whether the products are in
effective actual competition with one another.
33. 540 F.2d at 309.
34. See note 27 supra.
35. 540 F.2d at 310 (emphasis added).
36. It should be noted that the relevant factors may differ for other types of potential
Clayton Act, section 7 transactions, such as vertical mergers, product extension mergers,
geographic market extensions, pure conglomerate mergers, and joint ventures. See generally 2
VON KALINOWSKI [16A BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS], ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION,
§ 17.01 (1977).
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Second, how do producers view the particular products in question?
For example, are the products treated together in census data, in marketing
research data, in trade journals and other trade publications, and in member-
ships in trade associations? Similarly, are the products marketed and dis-
tributed together? Are they priced alike? Does the pricing of one disregard
the pricing of the other? Considerations of this type likewise go to the
question of whether the products are in effective actual competition with one
another.
Third, assuming some differences between the particular products in
question, how feasible is it for the producers of one to switch to production
of the other? Relevant considerations here might include technological
differences between the methods and processes of producing the products,
differences in the facilities and equipment used in their production, differ-
ences in the raw materials used for each, differences in the methods of
marketing and distributing each, and the capital cost of making the neces-
sary conversion. Considerations of this type, unlike those in the preceding
two categories, go to the altogether different issue of whether there is
effective prospective competition between the products.
Fourth, once the relevant product market (and relevant geographic
market) has been defined, what is the concentration and the trend towards
concentration within the industry that serves that market? In Beatrice, the
Federal Trade Commission stressed the fact that the industry showed a
marked trend towards increasing concentration. 37 The special significance
attached to market concentrations and market concentration trends is reflect-
ed not only in leading judicial decisions38 but also in the guidelines used by
the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission when deciding
whether to challenge particular transactions.
39
Fifth, what are the market shares of the firms involved in the transac-
tion? How will these change as a result of the transaction? In Beatrice, the
37. See note 9 supra.
38. See, e.g., United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); United States v.
Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966).
39. The Justice Department Merger Guidelines (I TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 4510) specify
market share figures that will ordinarily trigger a Department challenge. These figures vary,
depending upon whether the market: (1) is highly concentrated; (2) is less highly concentrated;
or (3) shows a trend towards concentration. Other publications that the practitioner should be
aware of include antimerger enforcement policies adopted by the Federal Trade Commission
for particular industries (I TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 4515); the Notification Rule adopted by
the Commission on August 15, 1974, for mergers or acquisitions involving very large manufac-
turing or nonmanufacturing corporations (1 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 4540); and the Premerger
Notification Rule recently adopted by the Commission and Justice Department under the 1976
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act. (see I TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 4255).
Practitioners should also be aware of the recent decision of the Commission in The Budd Co.,
86 F.T.C. 518 (1975), in which the Commission essentially set down guidelines for the types of
mergers and acquisitions that it will challenge.
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acquisition of Essex was invalidated even though the combined market
shares of Tip Top and Essex came to only 9.9% in the brush and roller
market and 10.7% in the roller submarket. ° The case may seem like an
exceptionally extreme one, in light of these minimal market share figures.
However, the Supreme Court itself has reached even further in the case of
United States v. Pabst Brewing Co.41 In Pabst, the High Court struck down
an acquisition in which the combined market share was only 4.49% where
the industry showed a trend towards increasing concentration. 42 Moreover,
the Court refused to consider evidence purportedly showing that the acquisi-
tion would not have anticompetitive effects. 43 Therefore, practitioners
should exercise considerable caution when gauging the wisdom of even
"minor" horizontal mergers and acquisitions.
JOHNSON PRODUCTs Co. v. F. T. C.
RESPONDENTS' RIGHT TO WITHDRAW FROM CONSENT ORDERS AND
CONSENT DECREES FOR CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES
A major concern of antitrust practitioners is that their clients receive
equal treatment from the government. For this reason, practitioners are
understandably concerned when their clients seem to have been "singled
out" for treatment more harsh than that afforded similarly-situated
competitors. Johnson Products Co. v. F.T.C." involved one company's
response to such a situation; it tried to withdraw from a negotiated consent
order when it appeared that its competitors would not be placed under
equally demanding orders.
Johnson arose in the specific context of a "consumer protection" case
brought by the Federal Trade Commission. The Seventh Circuit's treatment
of the case, however, goes far beyond this narrow context. First, since the
issues involved the Commission's consent order process as a whole, anti-
trust as well as consumer protection consent orders were ultimately at stake.
Secondly, the Seventh Circuit made it quite clear that its analysis of the
issues would apply equally to an attempt to withdraw from a Justice
Department consent decree: "[T]he procedures of the FTC and Justice
Department are similar in those aspects pertinent to the issues raised in this
appeal."
45
In Johnson, the Commission investigated the defendant company for
allegedly making deceptive representations concerning its hair relaxer prod-
40. 540 F.2d at 306 n.3.
41. 384 U.S. 546 (1966).
42. Id. at 550-53.
43. Id. at 553.
44. 549 F.2d 35 (7th Cir. 1977).
45. Id. at 39 n.5.
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ucts. Litigation was avoided, however, when Johnson executed an agree-
ment with the Commission containing a consent order.46 The consent order
prohibited Johnson from making certain misrepresentations for any of its
cosmetic products. According to Johnson, it had advised Commission staff
during the consent negotiations that if similar restrictions were not imposed
on its major competitors (Revlon, Inc. in particular), it would suffer a
competitive disadvantage. Johnson further contended that it had signed the
order in reliance on Commission staff assurances that the entire industry,
including Revlon, would be subjected to equally restrictive orders. 47
The Commission provisionally accepted the agreement containing the
consent order five months after Johnson had executed it. In accordance with
both the Commission's rules48 and the terms of the agreement, the order was
placed on the public record for a period of sixty days for the purpose of
obtaining comments from interested members of the public. The Commis-
sion was then to have an additional thirty days to consider the public
comments and either accept or reject the order. On the last day of the period
for public comment, Johnson notified the Commission that it was withdraw-
ing its consent because of " 'unexpected delay in reaching similar agree-
ments with the balance of the industry, and. . . the documentable threat of
unfair competition resulting therefrom.' "49 The Commission refused, how-
ever, to allow Johnson to withdraw its consent and instead entered a final
order based on the consent.50 Johnson, following an unsuccessful attempt to
persuade the Commission to reconsider the matter, 51 appealed to the
Seventh Circuit.
The first issue that faced the Seventh Circuit in Johnson was whether
Johnson had the right to unilaterally withdraw its consent to the agreement.
Johnson contended that contract principles apply to consent agreements, and
that under these principles, it was entitled to withdraw from the consent
agreement. Specifically, Johnson argued that when it attempted to with-
draw, the Commission had not yet "unconditionally accepted" the consent
agreement, and that since "mutuality of obligation" was therefore lacking,
Johnson was still free to revoke its offer.
52
46. The FTC consent order procedures are spelled out in 16 C.F.R. §§ 2.31-35.
47. 549 F.2d at 40, 42.
48. See 16 C.F.R. § 2.34 (1977) prior to amendment effective September 7, 1977.
49. 549 F.2d at 37.
50. Id.
51. It should be noted that under 16 C.F.R. § 3.72 (1977), the Commission may, in its
discretion, reopen a decision, even after it has become final, for changed circumstances.
Johnson did not concern such a discretionary reopening, however. Rather, Johnson was
concerned with whether a respondent can force such a reopening.
52. 549 F.2d at 37. The Johnson court found some support for its analysis in decisions of
the Supreme Court holding that for purposes of construing the terms of a consent order, normal
contract rules of construction are used. See United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420
U.S. 223, 236-38 (1975); United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 682 (1971).
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The Seventh Circuit agreed with Johnson that for certain purposes,
contract principles may apply to a consent order or a consent decree.
53
However, this will vary depending upon "the particular context in which the
issue arises." 54 Arguing that the consent order process "should not be
treated as a mere codification of the contract law of offer and acceptance,"
the court held that a respondent may not unilaterally withdraw from a
Commission consent agreement prior to final agency action." The court
found particularly persuasive the policy considerations underlying the
Commission's rules for "provisionally" accepting consent orders while
placing them on the public record for comment.56 Since the Commission,
unlike a private litigant, must act in furtherance of the "public interest," the
Commission was fully justified in allowing a sixty day time period for
public comment before its final acceptance of a consent order. By allowing
for public comment, the Commission enables the public itself to comment
on the wisdom of an agreement that would otherwise be entered into by the
Commission and the respondent without public scrutiny. Additionally, the
Seventh Circuit noted that the consent order process enables both the
Commission and respondents to avoid the cost and risk of litigation. 
57 If
respondents were able to freely withdraw from their consents, the Commis-
sion might be forced to abandon the use of this process and proceed directly
into litigation, at greater cost to the Commission and respondents alike.
Finally, the court noted that the Commission's time limitations (sixty days
and thirty days) were reasonable, so as not to leave the respondent "unila-
terally committed for an indefinite period. "58
The second issue raised in Johnson involved a somewhat more difficult
question, i.e., whether the Commission's refusal to allow withdrawal or at
least to hold a hearing on the matter constituted an abuse of discretion.
Johnson alleged two "circumstances" that it felt at least entitled it to a
hearing. The first was the "understanding" that it supposedly had with the
Commission staff concerning orders against other members of the indus-
try." The second was the fact that nearly a year after Johnson signed its
order, the Commission entered into a less restrictive order with one of
Johnson's major competitors, Revlon, Inc.
53. 549 F.2d at 38.
54. Id. at 37-38. The court cited as controlling the following statement from United States
v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223 (1975): "Consent decrees and orders have
attributes both of contracts and of judicial decrees or, in this case, administrative orders. ...
Because of this dual character, consent decrees are treated as contracts for some purposes but
not for.others." Id. at 236-37 n.10.
55. 549 F.2d at 38.
56. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
57. 549 F.2d at 39.
58. Id. at 40.
59. See text accompanying note 47 supra.
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The court first noted that the Commission does have the discretionary
power to enter an order against one firm, even though the illegal practice is
industrywide.6' However, that discretionary power is subject to judicial
review for "patent abuse of discretion.' '61 The court concluded that the
"inadequacy of the record" in Johnson precluded it from reaching the
question of whether the Johnson order, under all the circumstances, should
be set aside as an abuse of discretion. 62 In reaching this conclusion, the court
stressed that a consent proceeding, unlike an adjudicated proceeding, simply
does not produce the kind of record needed to resolve such an issue. 63 The
inference, then, was that Johnson was at least entitled to a hearing. How-
ever, this question, too, was not actually answered in Johnson, for the very
simple reason that the Commission unilaterally extended an invitation to
Johnson to petition to reopen the consent order proceeding three days prior
to oral argument before the court. 6' The court, therefore, simply remanded
the case to the Commission with instructions to hold such a proceeding.
65
The Seventh Circuit articulated a reasonable and satisfactory opinion
on the issue of a respondent's right to withdraw unilaterally from a consent
agreement. Unfortunately, its opinion on the second issue of abuse of
discretion and right to a hearing, while also well-reasoned, was less satisfac-
tory. The court constructed the analytical basis for a judicial review of
government "abuses" in the consent order procedure, but it stopped short of
actually conducting such a review because the Commission had voluntarily
allowed the respondent to apply for a reopening of the consent order. The
Commission's voluntary action did not establish that Johnson had a right to
a hearing. Rather, it only established that the Commission was willing to
allow a petition for reopening. Thus, the court's result leaves open the issue
60. See the cases cited by the Seventh Circuit at 549 F.2d at 41.
61. 549 F.2d at 41 (citing Moog Indus., Inc. v. F.T.C., 355 U.S. 411, 414 (1958)).
62. In a highly suggestive footnote, the court noted that in addition to judicial review for
abuse of discretion, there may be "due process problems" when a consent order is entered over
the objection of one of the parties. 549 F.2d at 41 n. 12 (citing United States v. Ward Baking Co.,
376 U.S. 327 (1964), and United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673 (1971)). Unfortunately,
neither of the cases cited is particularly illuminating on the scope of "due process" rights in the
context of an attempt to withdraw from a consent agreement. Ward concerned a district court's
entry of a proposed "consent" judgment to which the government had never agreed. The
Supreme Court held that the government had a right to trial to prove its factual allegations,
rather than be bound by a consent decree to which it had never consented. Armour involved an
attempt by the Justice Department to enforce a consent decree which the respondent had signed
some fifty years earlier. The Supreme Court held that the terms of the consent agreement had to
be read narrowly and, therefore, did not reach the specific activities of Armour. The Court
reasoned that "[b]ecause the defendant has, by the decree, waived his right to litigate the issues
raised, a right guaranteed to him by the Due Process Clause, the conditions upon which he has
given that waiver must be respected, and the instrument must be construed as it is written and
not as it might have been written. 402 U.S. at 682.
63. 549 F.2d at 41 n.13.
64. Id. at 42.
65. Id.
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of whether the Commission's refusal to allow withdrawal or to hold a
hearing in a situation similar to Johnson would constitute an abuse of
discretion.
A similar issue was considered and resolved by the Sixth Circuit in
Ford Motor Co. v. F. T. C. I In that case, Ford was investigated for alleged
misrepresentations concerning the "strength" and "quietness" of Ford
automobiles. It agreed to a consent order, however, that covered all per-
formance claims. During the sixty day period for public comment, Ford
learned that General Motors may have been allowed a consent order limited
only to certain types of performance claims and not covering all perform-
ance claims. Ford argued that the Commission staff had advised it that all
such orders were required to cover general "performance" claims, and on
the basis of the supposed disparity between the orders given to it and to
General Motors, attempted to withdraw from the consent. The Commission
refused. On appeal by Ford, the Sixth Circuit held that Ford had no right to
withdraw unilaterally from the consent, but further ruled that the Commis-
sion had abused its discretion by refusing to allow Ford a hearing as to
whether the disparate orders would place Ford at a competitive disadvan-
tage.6 7 The Sixth Circuit then proposed the following three requirements for
obtaining a Commission hearing in a Ford-type situation:
(1) [A] major change of circumstances after submission of the
consent order and before the Commission's final acceptance of
the order. (2) The change of circumstance must be one which
respondent could not reasonably have anticipated and over which
respondent had no control. (3) The change of circumstances must
be such as to state a prima facie case of unfair and serious
economic disadvantage capable of threatening the competitive
position of the respondent in the industry concerned.'
Based on the Ford criteria, it is not clear that Johnson had a right to a
Commission hearing on its claim of unfair treatment. Johnson would have to
make an initial allegation of a "major change of circumstance" after
submission of the order but before the Commission's final acceptance.
During that period, however, there had been no order entered against
Revlon-an inactivity which would be unlikely to be considered a "major
66. 1976-1 Trade Cas. 60,938 (6th Cir.), modified on other grounds, 547 F.2d 954 (6th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 915 (1977).
67. On a motion by the Commission for reconsideration, it cited a previous order entered
against General Motors and containing a broad prohibition concerning performance claims
comparable to the one against Ford. On the basis of that order, the Sixth Circuit held that the
Ford order had not placed Ford at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis General Motors
respecting the scope of its order. Ironically, then, even in Ford a judicially mandated hearing
was avoided. Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit's holding in Ford remains intact. Had the
Commission not made its eleventh hour proof that Ford was being treated equally, Ford would
have gotten its hearing.
68. Ford Motor Co. v. F.T.C., 1976-1 Trade Cas. 60,938 at 69,117-69,118 (1976).
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change of circumstance." It might be contended on Johnson's behalf,
however, that a "major change" had taken place during the interim between
its acceptance of the order and its attempted withdrawal. In Ford, the major
change of circumstance was allegedly the Commission's willingness to
accept an order which did not encompass all performance claims. Johnson
may have an argument that the Commission's policy had undergone a
similar change prior to Johnson's attempted withdrawal, as the Commission
may have either decided not to proceed against Johnson's competitors or to
accept orders less encompassing in their scope. There is no way of knowing
whether this argument is correct, however, since there is, ironically, no way
of knowing precisely what occurred until a hearing is conducted on the
issue.
Significance of Johnson to Antitrust Practitioners
Johnson is important to antitrust practitioners since it, like Ford,
suggests that companies may, under certain circumstances, be entitled to
withdraw their consent orders or consent decrees where competitors have
been treated more favorably by the government. The following six hypothet-
icals will hopefully suggest factors which companies must demonstrate if
they are to win in seeking such a withdrawal or at least in getting a hearing
on the matter.
First, during consent negotiations, the Commission attorney assures
your client that the entire industry will soon be placed under similar restric-
tions. Your client obtains a written statement to that effect from the
Commission and signs the proposed agreement. No similar orders are
forthcoming, and before the Commission's final acceptance, your client
notifies the Commission that it is withdrawing its consent. The basic
problem in Johnson was the lack of a record on which the court could
review "abuse of discretion." By obtaining a written statement from the
Commission or at least from the staff attorney,69 the respondent would be
building such a record for later judicial review. Since, however, both the
Commission's Rules of Practice70 and the standard language contained in
consent orders state explicitly that no "representation" not contained in the
order "may be used to vary or contradict the terms of the order,"71 it would
be wiser yet to have any such assurances entered into the order itself.
Second, your client has signed an order in reliance on Commission
staff representations that competitors will be placed under similar restric-
69. Since the Commission itself is not bound by the staff attorney's consent, it would be
advisable to obtain a Commission letter, if possible. See 16 C.F.R. § 2.32 (1977).
70. 16 C.F.R. §§ 0-15 (1977).
71. 16 C.F.R. § 2.32 (1977).
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tions. A competitor is allowed a less restrictive order and your client does
not petition for withdrawal or for a hearing until after the Commission's
final acceptance of the order. Johnson suggests that since the issue is one of
an "abuse of discretion" at the time the order is finally entered, the
company would not be entitled to withdrawal or to a hearing. Since any
change in circumstances would not have been brought to the Commission's
attention by the time the order became final, the Commission would not
have abused its discretion by simply assuming that the order was fair
when making it final. If withdrawal or a hearing is to be allowed, then it
must be under the discretionary power of the Commission to reopen even
final orders, 72 and not of right to the respondent.
Third, your client has signed an order and becomes aware that one of
its competitors has signed a less restrictive order. The Commission, how-
ever, has taken the added precaution of warning your client that it either may
not go against other similarly-situated competitors or may accept less de-
manding orders from them. Johnson argued that Commission staff had
assured it that other manufacturers would be treated in a similar manner.
73
There was nothing in the record, however, showing that this assurance had
been given. If the Commission had included in the agreement itself a clause
to the effect that no representation had been made about other manufactur-
ers, the Commission would likely have avoided the necessity of a hearing,
since it was precisely because of the absence of a record that the Seventh
Circuit suggested that a hearing was needed. When a company has been
expressly forewarned that all others may not be treated alike, it cannot, in
the words of the Sixth Circuit in Ford, argue that any ensuing inequality in
treatment was something that it "could not reasonably have anticipated."
74
Fourth, your client signs an order in reliance on Commission staff
representations that competitors will be placed under similar restrictions, but
a competitor is allowed a less restrictive order. The disparities between your
client's order and the one allowed its competitor are less extreme than those
present in Johnson. For example, the disparity might involve an order
against your client relating to "all hair products," while an order against its
competitor involves "all hair straighteners." In Ford, the Sixth Circuit
stated that in such a situation, it is necessary for the company to show "a
prima facie case of unfair and serious economic disadvantage" capable of
threatening its competitive position in the industry. 75 In Johnson, the
Seventh Circuit did not clearly elaborate what constitutes an "abuse of
discretion." However, it suggested at least one relevant factor when it stated
72. See note 51 supra.
73. See text accompanying note 47 supra.
74. Ford Motor Co. v. F.T.C., 1976-1 Trade Cas. 60,938 at 69,117-18.
75. See text accompanying note 68 supra.
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that "[i]t is the responsibility of the Commission to perform a 'reasonable
evaluation' of the competitive situation to ascertain whether a particular
order would be contrary to the purpose of the laws sought to be enforced.' '76
In other words, is the disparity such as to cut against competition rather than
promote it?
Fifth, your client signs an order in reliance on Commission staff
representations that competitors will be placed under similar restrictions, but
a competitor is allowed a less restrictive order. Instead of, or in addition to,
petitioning for withdrawal or a hearing, your client petitions the Commis-
sion to "modify" the terms of the order, in accordance with the Commis-
sion's power under Rule 2.34 to withdraw its provisional acceptance and
"take such other action as it may consider appropriate." 77 This is a less
extreme situation than either Johnson or Ford, where the companies sought
to completely withdraw their consents. Since the company would here be
willing to remain bound by the order, and is simply seeking modification of
its terms, the Commission might be far more willing to acquiesce, although
this remains an as yet untested hypothesis.
Finally, a recent change in the Commission's rules has possibly created
a whole new "hypothetical," one which is apt to again bring the "unilateral
withdrawal" issue before the Seventh Circuit. Under the previous rules, the
Commission had thirty days to make a final acceptance of a consent order
following the sixty day period for public comment.78 The Seventh Circuit
relied on the reasonableness of that time limit in rejecting Johnson's argu-
ment that it was entitled to "unilaterally withdraw" its consent, expressly
noting that Johnson was not left "unilaterally committed for an indefinite
period." 7 9 Effective September 7, 1977, the relevant rule 80 was changed so
as to completely drop the thirty day time limitation. The Commission may
now accept or reject an agreed-to order at any time following the sixty day
period for public comment. 81 This change in procedure has the result of
leaving respondents "unilaterally committed for an indefinite period." The
Commission, far from learning from Johnson, seems to have invited another
such legal dispute.
TIGER TRASH V. BROWNING-FERRIS INDUSTRIES, INC.
"INTERSTATE COMMERCE" AND CLAYTON ACT
SECTION 12 VENUE
Two issues of importance to antitrust practitioners were involved in the
76. 549 F.2d at 41 (quoting L.G. Balfour Co. v. F.T.C., 442 F.2d 1, 24 (7th Cir. 1971)).
77. 16 C.F.R. § 2.34 (1977).
78. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
79. 549 F.2d at 40.
80. 42 Fed. Reg. 39,658 (1977) (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. §§ 2.34-35, 3.25).
81. Id.
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case of Tiger Trash v. Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc. 82 The first issue
involved the question of how "minimal" the interstate activities of a
company can be and still satisfy the "interstate commerce" requirement of
section 2 of the Sherman Act.83 The second issue involved the question of
when the relationship between a foreign parent corporation and its local
subsidiary is such that venue over the parent company under section 12 of
the Clayton Act" can be based simply upon the local business transactions
of the subsidiary.
Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc. 85 is a Delaware corporation with its
principal office and place of business in Houston, Texas. Since 1969, BFI
has attempted to build a nationwide network of solid waste disposal serv-
ices. BFI is not itself, however, engaged in the waste removal business.
Rather, BFI is a non-operating holding company that has acquired several
wholly-owned subsidiaries already engaged in the waste removal business in
various states. Browning-Ferris Industries of Indiana, Inc. 8 6 is one of the
subsidiaries that BFI has acquired in this manner. BFI-Indiana is engaged in
the business of providing refuse removal service for industry, commercial
establishments, and apartments in the Evansville, Indiana, and Henderson,
Kentucky, market area.
Tiger Trash competes with BFI-Indiana in the Evansville-Henderson
market area. In 1975, Tiger Trash brought suit in the Southern District of
Indiana against BFI and BFI-Indiana under section 2 of the Sherman Act and
a similar provision of the Indiana Antitrust Act87 for allegedly attempting to
monopolize the refuse collection business in the Evansville-Henderson mar-
ket. BFI moved to dismiss the complaint against it on the ground of
improper venue, arguing that it had not engaged in any business activity in
the Southern District of Indiana that would subject it to personal jurisdiction
under section 12 of the Clayton Act. BFI-Indiana moved for summary
judgment on the ground that the challenged activities did not involve
interstate commerce. The district court granted both BFI's motion to dismiss
and BFI-Indiana's motion for summary judgment.88 Tiger Trash thereupon
appealed both rulings to the Seventh Circuit.
89
82. 1977-2 Trade Cas. 61,585 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3453 (U.S. Jan.
16, 1978) (No. 77-705).
83. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. IV 1974).
84. 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1970).
85. Hereinafter referred to in the text as BFI.
86. Hereinafter referred to in the text as BFI-Indiana.
87. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 24-1-2-2, 24-1-2-7 (1974).
88. Tiger Trash v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 1976-2 Trade Cas. 61,141 (S.D. Ind.
1976).
89. A third issue not relevant to this discussion was whether the district court acted
improperly in staying discovery pending resolution of the defendant's respective motions to
dismiss and for summary judgment.
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The "Interstate Commerce" Issue
For section 2 of the Sherman Act to apply, it must be shown that the
defendant has monopolized, attempted to monopolize, or combined or
conspired to monopolize any part of trade or commerce "among the several
States,"9° i.e., "interstate commerce" as opposed to purely "intrastate
commerce." This jurisdictional language has been held to apply not only to
transactions acting directly upon or within the actual stream of interstate
commerce (the "in commerce" or "flow of commerce" test)91 but also to
transactions which, although wholly intrastate in character, affect a substan-
tial amount of interstate commerce (the "substantial effect" test).92 While
both tests are directed at the same ultimate issue of whether the "interstate
commerce" requirement of section 2 of the Sherman Act has been met, they
are altogether different in their analytical approach to the problem.
In Tiger Trash, the district court failed to distinguish between these
two tests. Instead, it focused upon the "substantial effect" test to the
apparent exclusion of the "in commerce" test, stating that "[t]he law is
well settled that in order to invoke the provisions of the Sherman Act, the
plaintiff must show that the defendant's alleged violations had an impact
which substantially affected interstate commerce." 93 Having thus phrased
the standard in these restrictive terms, the district court pointed to several
factors in support of its conclusion that Tiger Trash had failed to satisfy the
"interstate commerce" jurisdictional requirement. The court noted that
BFI-Indiana had only $6,000 worth of its refuse containers permanently
located in Henderson, Kentucky. 94 This was less that 1% of the total
equipment used by BFI-Indiana, with the remaining equipment being used
wholly within Evansville, Indiana. The court similarly noted that BFI-
90. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. IV 1974). For a general discussion of the "interstate commerce"
issue, see Annot., 52 L. Ed. 488 (1926); Note, Portrait of the Sherman Act as a Commerce
Clause Statute, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 323 (1974).
91. See Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 398-99 (1905) (purchase of livestock at
local stockyards held to be in interstate commerce where cattle were regularly sent to the
stockyards from other states with the expectation of sale, and the only interruption in the flow
of interstate commerce was the location of an actual purchaser at the stockyards). See also
United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfrs. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460 (1949).
92. See Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738 (1976). The court stated:
It is settled that the [Sherman] Act encompasses far more than restraints on trade that
are motivated by a desire to limit interstate commerce. "Wholly local business re-
straints can produce the effects condemned by the Sherman Act." United States v.
Employing Plasterers Assn., 347 U.S. 186, 189 (1954). As long as the restraint in
question "substantially and adversely affects interstate commerce," Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 195 (1974); Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Ameri-
can Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. at 234, the interstate commerce nexus required for
Sherman Act coverage is established.
Id. at 743.
93. 1976-2 Trade Cas. 61,141 (S.D. Ind. 1976).
94. Id. at 70,151.
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Indiana's estimated annual revenue of $30,000 from the Henderson area was
only 3-4% of its Evansville volume. 95 The court concluded that these
interstate activities were at most "de minimus" and "not sufficient to
transform an essentially intrastate business into an interstate business.'"96
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit correctly distinguished between the "in
commerce" and "substantial effect" tests, 97 and noted that Tiger Trash
expressly relied on the "in commerce" jurisdictional test. Applying that
test, the court found that $30,000 of interstate sales was sufficient to bring
BFI-Indiana's activities within purview of section 2 of the Sherman Act. 98
In addition, the court further concluded that "[a]lthough the 'substantial
effect' test was not relied on by plaintiff, . . . this test is also met. "99
Having thus determined that both jurisdictional tests had been met, the court
held that the
plaintiff has adequately charged that a sufficient part of interstate
commerce, namely the Evansville-Henderson market for refuse
disposal, was affected. . . .What the proofs will show is another
matter, but at least plaintiff must be permitted to show (if it can)
that an interstate market, the Henderson-Evansville area, was
being monopolized by defendants.100
Tiger Trash is an extreme illustration of the great lengths that courts
have gone to in finding "interstate commerce." If $30,000 is not de
minimis, it is hard to conceive of what would be. Similarly, if $30,000 is
"substantial," it is hard to conceptualize what would be deemed "insub-
stantial." Review of the case law, however, shows that other courts have
been equally as liberal in finding the commerce requirement of section 2 of
the Sherman Act to be satisfied, particularly where it has been the "in
commerce," rather than the "substantial effect," test that has been in-
volved. Where it is argued that a challenged practice actually and directly
acts upon or within interstate commerce itself (the "in commerce" test),
even an extremely minimal amount of interstate commerce will suffice. '
0'
95. Id.
96. Id. at 70,152.
97. 1977-2 Trade Cas. 61,585 at 72,385-86 (7th Cir. 1977).
98. The court declined to consider the question of whether there is an exception for cases
involving only de minimis interstate commerce, since it reasoned that in any event $30,000 was
not de minimis. See, e.g., Greenville Publishing Co. v. Daily Reflector, Inc., 496 F.2d 391 (4th
Cir. 1974): "[W]hile a 'substantial quantity' of national advertising is apparently enough to
satisfy the 'in commerce' test, . . . isolated and infrequent sales of interstate advertising might
not suffice to transform a smalitown newspaper into an interstate business." Id. at 395
(citations omitted). See also cases discussed in note 102 infra.
99. 1977-2 Trade Cas. 61,585 at 72,386.
100. Id. (citations omitted).
101. See, e.g., United States v. Bensinger Co., 430 F.2d 584 (8th Cir. 1970) (the sale across
state lines of a single dishwasher priced at $10,000 was held to satisfy the interstate commerce
requirement of section 1 of the Sherman Act). See also Ford Wholesale Co. v. Fibreboard
Paper Prods. Corp., 344 F. Supp. 1323 (N.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd, 493 F.2d 1204 (9th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 876 (1974) ("[i]t is true that, if a restraint occurs within the 'flow' of
ANTITRUST
At some point, the amount of interstate commerce involved presumably may
be so marginal as to fall outside the jurisdiction of the Sherman Act. 102 Tiger
Trash makes it clear, however, that so far as the Seventh Circuit is
concerned, the amount of interstate activity involved must be marginal
indeed before jurisdiction will be lacking.
The "Venue" Issue
Section 12 of the Clayton Act contains a special venue provision
applicable to corporate defendants. 103 Under section 12, venue is proper in
any judicial district in which the corporate defendant is "an inhabitant," 04
"may be found,''" 05 or "transacts business."' 1 6 In several recent antitrust
cases, this far-reaching venue provision has been applied to reach foreign
parent corporations solely on the basis of the local activities of their wholly-
owned subsidiaries.' 0 7 Tiger Trash is such a case.
interstate commerce, substantial effect on interstate commerce then follows as a matter of law
and there is no need to show that any particular amount of interstate commerce was affected by
the restraint." 344 F. Supp. at 1327); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940) ("in the
application of the Sherman Act, . . . it is the nature of the restraint and its effect on interstate
commerce and not the amount of the commerce which are the tests of violation." Id. at 485).
102. See, e.g., Yellow Cab Co. v. Cab Employers, Automotive & Warehousemen Local
881, 457 F.2d 1032 (9th Cir. 1972) (the transportation of passengers between California and
Nevada and from a local interstate railroad station to a local interstate airport did not satisfy the
"in commerce" test because these activities were only $8,500 or 1/2% of the plaintiff's annual
revenues. The Ninth Circuit argued that:
[a]lthough it is true that the courts have held that a small amount of interstate
commerce is sufficient to obtain federal jurisdiction, they have done so when the
nature of the conspiracy has been directed against interstate commerce. . . .Given
the miniscule amount of business generated by Yellow Cab's interstate activity, it is
readily apparent that intrastate business 'was the subject of the conspiracy.'
Id. at 1034-1035. See also J.P. Mascaro & Sons, Inc. v. William J. O'Hara, Inc., 1976-2 Trade
Cas. 61,139 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
103. Section 12 of the Clayton Act states: "Any suit, action, or proceeding under the
antitrust laws against a corporation may be brought not only in the judicial district whereof it is
an inhabitant, but also in any district wherein it may be found or transacts business; and all
process in such cases may be served in the district of which it is an inhabitant, or wherever it
may be found." 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1970). For a general discussion of issues involving venue, see
Annot., 3 A.L.R. Fed. 120 (1970); Note, Antitrust Venue: Transacting Business Under the
Clayton Act, 55 GEO. L.J. 1066 (1967); Note, Venue in Private Antitrust Suits, 37 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 268 (1962); Note, Transacting Business as a Basisfor Venue Overa Corporation under the
Antitrust Laws, 1962 WASH. U.L.Q. 261.
104. A corporation is "an inhabitant" of the state in which it is incorporated. Winkler-
Koch Eng'r Co. v. Universal Oil Prod. Co., 70 F. Supp. 77, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
105. A corporation is "found" in any district in which it is "present" and conducting
"continuous local activities." Fox-Keller, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 338 F.
Supp. 812, 815 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
106. A corporation "transacts business" within a district when, in a "practical, everyday
business or commercial" sense, it is "doing or carrying on business 'of any substantial
character.' " United States v. Scophony Corp., 333 U.S. 795, 807 (1948).
107. See, e.g., Call Carl, Inc. v. BP Oil Corp., 391 F. Supp. 367 (D. Md. 1975); Hitt v.
Nissan Motor Co., 399 F. Supp. 838 (S.D. Fla. 1975); Bottino v. McDonald's Corp., 1974-2
Trade Cas. 75,256 (S.D. Fla. 1974); Dobbins v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., 362 F. Supp. 54 (D.
Ore. 1973); Luria Steel & Trading Corp. v. Ogden Corp., 327 F. Supp. 1345 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
In Tiger Trash, the district court applied a very narrow standard in
determining whether BFI (the parent corporation) could be sued in the
Southern District of Indiana solely because of the business transactions of its
wholly-owned subsidiary, BFI-Indiana:
The crucial issue is whether or not the parent controls the
day-to-day operations of its subsidiary. . . . The parent must not
only have the opportunity to control, it must actually and con-
sciously exercise such control. . . . The control must be such
that the parent and subsidiary act almost as a single business en-
tity. .. . 108
Several factors were cited by the district court in support of its conclusion
that BFI did not "control the day-to-day business operations" of its sub-
sidiary. Evidence that BFI-Indiana selected the type of services it would
offer and the geographical area in which it would operate, set its own prices,
conducted its own local promotional efforts, selected and paid its own
employees, owned its own assets and equipment, and planned and paid for
its own capital improvements' °9 convinced the district court that venue in
the Southern District of Indiana would be improper.
On appeal, however, the Seventh Circuit stated that "the issue under
Section 12 of the Clayton Act is whether BFI exercised sufficient control
over its Indiana subsidiary to cause the parent to 'transact business' in
Indiana within the special venue provision of the Clayton Act.""1 ' This
phrasing dropped any reference to control by the parent over the "day-to-
day" operations of the subsidiary which the district court found to be
"crucial.""' Factors which the Seventh Circuit considered controlling
under its phrasing of the test included the fact that some of the officers of
BFI-Indiana were also officers of BFI, the use of consolidated financial
statements and tax returns, and the use of nationwide advertising and
promotional activities that essentially held out BFI and its subsidiaries as a
single operation."12 In addition, BFI's assistance in signing up customers, in
making basic market development and resource allocation decisions, in
providing finances, systems accounting and management supervision, in
setting and enforcing return-on-investment standards, and in making its
trade names available to the subsidiary were also considered to be control-
ling by the Seventh Circuit. "13 It was particularly noted that a regional sales
manager of BFI had actually entered Indiana and solicited sales for BFI-
Indiana. 4 Given these factors, the court concluded that there was "enough
108. 1976-2 Trade Cas. 61,141 at 70,149 (citation omitted).
109. Id. at 70,149-50.
110. 1977-2 Trade Cas. 61,585 at 72,383.
111. 1976-2 Trade Cas. 61,141 at 70,149.




control and direction from parent to subsidiary to make the parent amenable
to suit in the Southern District of Indiana." 115 Moreover, the court
concluded that since a "sufficient level of control" had been shown, it
would "not discuss the countervailing facts relied upon by BF, 1 "6 i.e.,
the "day-to-day" factors relied upon by the district court in coming to an
exactly opposite conclusion.
The contradictory results reached by the district court and the Seventh
Circuit in Tiger Trash reflect the abstruse nature of venue questions in
antitrust cases. As one court has expressed the problem, "[t]he test of venue
turns on the facts of each case; generalizations are, for the most part,
impossible.""' 7 Nevertheless, a review of the existing case law indicates
that the Seventh Circuit was correct in rejecting the narrow "day-to-day
control" test of the district court.118 The standard which seems to emerge is
whether the parent corporation has influenced "major" decisions of the
subsidiary which caused or contributed to the alleged antitrust violations. 119
The major policy decisions of BFI-Indiana in which BFI was involved seem
to have been of this character, particularly in light of the fact that BF, as a
mere holding company, necessarily operated through its subsidiaries. As the
court noted, a strict "day-to-day control" test would enable large American
corporations like BF "to circumvent the antitrust laws by incorporating the
many functional parts of the parent into local operations." 2 Such a result
115. Id.
116. Id. at 72,384.
117. Call Carl, Inc. v. BP Oil Corp., 391 F. Supp. 367, 371 (D. Md. 1975).
118. See cases cited at notes 107 supra, and 119 infra. See also Sunrise Toyota, Ltd. v.
Toyota Motor Co., 55 F.R.D. 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). For cases holding that the parent did not
exercise sufficient control over the subsidiary, see O.S.C. Corp. v. Toshiba America, Inc., 491
F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1974); United States ex rel. Martin-Trigona v. Bankamerica Corp., 1974
Trade Cas. 74,916 (D.D.C. 1974); San Antonio Tel. Co., Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 499
F.2d 349 (5th Cir. 1974); Pfeiffer v. United Booking Office, Inc., 93 F. Supp. 363 (N.D. I11.
1950).
119. Flank Oil Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 277 F. Supp. 357 (D. Colo. 1967) ("Scophony
[United States v. Scophony Corp., 333 U.S. 795 (1948)] teaches that the parent need not control
day-to-day activity of the subsidiary as a prerequisite to jurisdiction. Rather the important test
in that case appears to be whether the parent's control is sufficient to influence and control
those decisions which might involve violation of the antitrust laws." Id. at 365). See also Call
Carl, Inc. v. BP Oil Corp., 391 F. Supp. 367 (D. Md. 1975) ("The key factor, however, in
determining venue is the ability of the parent to influence major decisions of the subsidiary
which lead or could lead to violations of the antitrust laws." Id. at 371). See also Hitt v. Nissan
Motor Company, Ltd., 399 F. Supp. 838 (S.D. Fla. 1975) (expressly rejecting the "day-to-day
control" test and, instead, looking to the degree of "influence and control over those decisions
which might involve violations of the antitrust laws." Id. at 842).
120. 1977-2 Trade Cas. 61,585 at 72,384. For a case in which the relationship between
parent and subsidiary was viewed in a similar light, see United States v. Scophony Corp., 333
U.S. 795 (1948). The Supreme Court stated that a foreign parent company had created its
local subsidiary not merely as an investment but as an alternative means of carrying on its
business. Since the parent's ultimate objective remained the same, the Supreme Court disre-
garded the formalistic parent-subsidiary distinction and held the parent to be subject to local
jurisdiction and process under section 12 of the Clayton Act. See also Call Carl, Inc. v. BP Oil
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could greatly undercut the very rationale underlying the permissive venue
provisions of section 12. As expressed by the Supreme Court, Congress'
"remedial purpose" in enacting section 12 was the following:
[I]t relieved persons injured through corporate violations of the
antitrust laws from the "often insuperable obstacle" of resorting
to distant forums for redress of wrongs done in the places of their
business or residence. A foreign corporation no longer could come
to a district, perpetrate there the injuries outlawed, and then by
retreating or even without retreating to its headquarters defeat or
delay the retribution due.'
2'
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Tiger Trash is both consistent with and in
furtherance of this underlying purpose.
Significance of Tiger Trash to Antitrust Practitioners
Tiger Trash is doubly significant to antitrust practitioners with corpo-
rate clients engaged in or considering interstate activities. First, the decision
holds that even minimal interstate activities may bring a company's entire
operation within the reach of section 2 of the Sherman Act. 2 2 Thus, for
example, once it was concluded in Tiger Trash that $30,000 of activities in
Kentucky was a sufficient amount to satisfy the "interstate commerce"
jurisdictional requirement, the plaintiff was allowed to challenge not only
those minimal activities but another $750,000 of activities conducted solely
within the state of Indiana. Clients who, like BFI-Indiana, do business at or
near a state's borders should, therefore, be cautioned of the risk that may
result from even minimal activities beyond those borders. They may find
themselves subject to suit not only under state law but under federal law as
well, even though their overall operation seems to be intrastate in character.
If the state law simply tracks the federal law, this risk may seem of limited
significance. If, however, the federal law is more far-reaching, the risk may
well be one that the client would rather avoid by simply discontinuing its
interstate activities.
A similar consideration is raised by the second holding in Tiger Trash.
Parent corporations cannot shield themselves from "forum shopping" by
potential antitrust litigants simply by refraining from control over the "day-
to-day" operations of their subsidiaries. So long as the parent continues to
exercise control over major decisions of the subsidiary, the parent may be
reached for venue purposes through the subsidiary, thereby subjecting the
Corp., 391 F. Supp. 367 (D. Md. 1975) ("Section 12 is a venue provision peculiar to antitrust
law. It is meant to provide injured plaintiffs with the opportunity to reach large corporate
enterprises which seek to insulate themselves through the proliferation of subsidiaries which
undertake the marketing, purchasing and selling functions of the parent in the local jurisdiction
where the activities of the subsidiary are guided by the parent." Id. at 371-72).
121. United States v. Scophony Corp., 333 U.S. 795, 808 (1948).
122. See text accompanying note 101 supra.
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parent to suit in what may well be a highly inconvenient forum. Clients
should, therefore, be forewarned that separate incorporation does not assure
separate treatment. If the purpose of operating through local subsidiaries is
to protect the parent from antitrust lawsuits in distant, inconvenient forums,
then the parent must grant the subsidiaries unfettered control over not only
their day-to-day operations, but also their major policy decisions. This is
particularly true where the parent is, like BFI, a mere holding company that
effectively operates through its local subsidiaries.
ILLINOIS V. SARBA UGH
PLAINTIFFS'ACCESS TO GRAND JURY TRANSCRIPTS
IN PRIVATE TREBLE DAMAGES ACTIONS
A noteworthy case for members of the antitrust bar is Illinois v.
Sarbaugh.123 In Sarbaugh, the Seventh Circuit released grand jury tran-
scripts taken in a prior federal criminal antitrust proceeding to the state of
Illinois, the plaintiff in a follow-up treble damages action based on the same
alleged misconduct. Although Sarbaugh does not pose a "pure" antitrust
issue, the decision nevertheless has obvious and considerable significance
for antitrust practitioners, since grand jury transcripts can prove a veritable
gold mine of valuable information for private litigants. Because of the
practical importance of Sarbaugh, the decision deserves at least some
mention.
In Sarbaugh, a criminal action was brought by the Justice Department
against nine highway construction contractors who were indicted by a
federal grand jury and charged with violating section 1 of the Sherman
Act.124 The government alleged that the contractors had submitted rigged
bids to the state of Illinois and had conspired to allocate contracts let by the
state in connection with an interstate highway project. The grand jury took
testimony from key employees of the contractors, and transcripts of this
testimony were released to the contractors pursuant to rule 16(a)(1)(A) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 25 The criminal action ended,
however, when the defendants entered pleas of nolo contendere.
Thereafter, the state of Illinois brought a treble damages action against
123. 552 F.2d 768 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 262 (1977).
124. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970) provides that "every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal .... "
125. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(I)(A) provides in pertinent part that where the defendant is a
corporation, partnership, association or labor union, the trial court may grant the defendant
discovery of relevant grand jury testimony of any witness who (1) at the time the testimony was
given, was an officer or employee with the power to legally bind the defendant with respect to
the conduct constituting the alleged offense, or (2) at the time the alleged offense was committ-
ed, was personally involved in the alleged misconduct and was an officer or employee with the
power to legally bind the defendant with respect to the misconduct.
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the nine contractors and five other highway construction firms based on the
same alleged conspiracy. 126 As part of this action, the state moved under
rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 127 for an order requiring
the Justice Department to release the grand jury transcripts for use by the
state in preparing for the employees' trial or deposition testimony. By this
time, approximately four years had elapsed since the grand jury testimony
was taken. When the Justice Department did not oppose the motion, the
defendants were allowed to intervene, without objection by the state. 128 The
district court denied the motion, holding that the requisite "particularized
showing" of "compelling necessity" for disclosure had not been made.
129
The defendants then appealed to the Seventh Circuit.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit was faced with two key issues. 130 The
first of these issues was whether the defendants had standing to intervene
and oppose discovery in a proceeding to compel disclosure of grand jury
testimony brought by the plaintiff against the Justice Department, rather
than against the defendants. In an earlier per curiam opinion, the Third
Circuit held that defendants in an analogous case lacked such "standing"
and, therefore, could not object to an order directing the Justice Department
to produce grand jury testimony for use by private litigants. I3I The Seventh
Circuit, however, rejected the position taken by the Third Circuit and
argued, quite logically, that disclosure of the grand jury transcripts would
adversely affect the defendants. 132 Moreover, the defendants were "likely to
be the only ones to object to an order for disclosure. ,133 The court reasoned
that if a proceeding to determine the need for disclosure was to have any real
126. 552 F.2d at 771.
127. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) provides for disclosure of matters before the grand jury "only
when so directed by the court." The rule is construed to be a continuation of the common law
rule of grand jury secrecy. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 309 F.2d 440 (3rd Cir.
1962).
128. 552 F.2d at 771.
129. The requirement of a "particularized showing of compelling necessity" is found in
such leading cases as Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 869-72 (1966); Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 399-400 (1959); United States v. Procter & Gamble
Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681-83 (1958). In Procter & Gamble, the Supreme Court suggested the type
of delicate balance that must be achieved in cases of this type. On the one hand, the trial court
must give due consideration to the reasons that underlie the "long-established policy that
maintains the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings in the federal courts." 356 U.S. at 681. On
the other hand, the court must consider the interests served by discovery as a means of making
the trial "less a game of blindman's bluff and more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts
disclosed to the fullest practicable extent." Id. at 682. To achieve this balance, the burden is on
the party seeking discovery to show a "compelling necessity" for disclosure and to make this
showing "with particularity." Id. For a general discussion of discovery of grand jury tes-
timony, see 2 F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 384 (12th ed. 1974).
130. A third, less significant issue was whether the district court's order was final and
appealable. The Seventh Circuit held that it was, even though the order allowed for later
discovery if and when a showing of "particularized need" was made. 552 F.2d at 773-74.
131. United States v. American Oil Co., 456 F.2d 1043, 1044 (3d Cir. 1972).
132. 552 F.2d at 773.
133. Id.
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substance as an adversary proceeding, the defendants should be allowed to
appear. 34 As a result, the defendant's intervention was upheld. 1
35
The second key issue confronting the Seventh Circuit in Sarbaugh was
whether the defendants should have been allowed access to the grand jury
transcripts. In deciding this issue, the court applied a balancing test, balanc-
ing the need for secrecy of grand jury testimony against the need for
disclosure. 136 It reasoned that the "level of need" for disclosure that must
be shown diminishes "as the reason for preserving secrecy becomes less
compelling. "137 Since the original criminal case had long since ended, the
court argued that the sole remaining reason for secrecy was protection of the
grand jury witnesses from retaliation by their existing or prospective em-
ployers. 138 This reason, however, had been substantially undercut by disclo-
sure of the transcripts to those most likely to retaliate-the witnesses' own
employers. 139 The need for secrecy had been further eroded, the court
continued, because at least one of the original criminal defendants had
already released the transcripts to one of the five newly-added defendant
companies. 10 Given these factors, the court concluded that any remaining
interest in grand jury secrecy was "residual" at best.' 41
Turning next to the need for disclosure, the court argued that the state
had a legitimate need for the transcripts in order to prepare for the witnesses'
trial or deposition testimony.' 42 This need was heightened by the unfairness
of releasing the transcripts to some of the defendants while denying them to
the state,1 43 and by the considerable amount of time that had elapsed
between the time of the grand jury proceedings and the state's civil ac-
tion. 14 The court further reasoned that this need could not be adequately
protected by an in camera review by the trial judge for any inconsistencies
between the grand jury transcripts and the witnesses' trial or deposition
testimony. 145 The court concluded that the transcripts should have been
134. Id.
135. The court also held that any right that the state might otherwise have had to object to
the defendant's intervention was waived when the state failed to object on this ground in the
district court. 552 F.2d at 772. Not stopping here, however, the court went on to hold that, in
any event, the defendants were entitled to intervene.
136. See note 129 supra.
137. 552 F.2d at 774.
138. Id. at 775.
139. Id. For other possible factors favoring grand jury secrecy, see those suggested in
United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681-82 n.6 (1958). See also 1 F.
WHARTON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 221 (12th ed. 1974); 1 L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES § 6:118 (1966); Annot., 127 A.L.R. 272 (1940).
140. 552 F.2d at 775.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 777.
143. Id. at 776.
144. Id. at 776 n.12.
145. Id. at 776-77.
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released to the state, but imposed protective limitations to protect the
remaining residual interest in secrecy.146
Sarbaugh is a well-organized, well-reasoned decision that seems to
logically extend principles laid down in earlier decisions of the Supreme
Court.147 Nevertheless, it appears to reach a result contrary to that reached
by the Fifth Circuit in a similar and contemporaneous case, Texas v. United
States Steel Corp.148 In that case, the Fifth Circuit reversed a district court
order granting the state of Texas access to grand jury transcripts which had
been released to the witnesses' employers in an earlier criminal antitrust
case against the employers. 149 It would seem that the two cases can be
reconciled on their facts. In Sarbaugh, the transcripts had already been
shared with a co-defendant who was not involved in the earlier criminal
case, 150 while in United States Steel, there was no such sharing of the
transcripts.151 The logic underlying the two decisions cannot, however, be
so reconciled. 152
Significance of Sarbaugh to Antitrust Practitioners
Sarbaugh is significant to antitrust practitioners not so much because
of what it holds as it is for what it suggests. The decision suggests that at
least the following six factors are relevant when deciding whether a particu-
lar party, like the plaintiff in Sarbaugh, is entitled to access to grand jury
materials:
First, who is making the request? In Sarbaugh, the requesting party
was the state of Illinois.' 53 What if, however, the request had been made by
an actual or prospective employer of the grand jury witness? The Seventh
Circuit expressly recognized that even in the Sarbaugh fact setting, a
146. Id. at 777. Copying was prohibited, the transcripts were to be returned when no longer
needed, the defendants were allowed to object to the release of any irrelevant material, and the
transcripts were released to a single attorney representing the state, who was directed to keep
detailed records of those using them.
147. See note 129 supra.
148. 546 F.2d 626 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3238 (U.S. Oct. 11, 1977) (No. 76-
1710).
149. The Fifth Circuit stressed two arguments. First, the court analogized the situation to
one in which an individual witness has testified to the grand jury. The fear of retaliation by
others will remain even if the witness obtains the transcripts of his own testimony, so that
release of the transcripts should be denied, absent a showing of "particularized need." When
the witness' corporate employer obtains the transcripts, "it acts in a capacity little different
from an individual defendant who seeks his own transcript." 546 F.2d at 629-30. The second
argument stressed by the Fifth Circuit was that automatic release of the grand jury transcripts
would unduly restrict the corporate defendant's use of the criminal defense tool provided by
FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(A). 546 F.2d at 630.
150. See text accompanying note 141 supra.
151. 546 F.2d at 628.
152. Compare the discussion of Sarbaugh in the text accompanying notes 136-46 supra,
with the discussion of United States Steel at note 149 supra.
153. See text accompanying note 127 supra.
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"residual" interest in grand jury secrecy remained, i.e., protecting the
witness from retaliation by actual or prospective employers. 5 4 Does this
mean that had the request been made by such a party, the request would
have been denied? If so, who is a "prospective" employer of the witness?
These are difficult questions that the Seventh Circuit will no doubt have to
face, assuming that Sarbaugh itself is not overturned by the Supreme Court.
Second, what is the purpose of the request? In Sarbaugh, the plaintiff
requested the grand jury materials to aid it in preparing for deposition and
trial testimony of specific witnesses.155 What if, however, the request were
made by a member of the press who wished to discuss the criminal case or
by a competitor of the defendant who simply wanted input on the feasibility
of bringing a lawsuit? At least one court has held that only three groups are
entitled to grand jury materials: attorneys for the government; the criminal
defendant upon a proper showing; and third parties in conjunction with
actual judicial proceedings. 156 In other words, it appears that the purpose
must, at the very least, be to facilitate an actual judicial proceeding and not a
mere general interest in the matters covered by the grand jury. Query,
however, how this conclusion is affected by the Freedom of Information
Act, 157 a question not before the Seventh Circuit in Sarbaugh. 158
Third, to whom is the request directed? In Sarbaugh, the materials
were requested from the Department of Justice.159 What if, however, the
request had been directed at the defendants themselves? Apparently, the
case would then have been treated no differently, since the Seventh Circuit
specifically stated that it saw "no significance" in the distinction between a
request addressed to the prosecutor and one directed at the criminal defend-
ants."1  What if, however, the request had been directed at the actual grand
154. See text accompanying notes 141, 146 supra.
155. See text accompanying note 127 supra.
156. United States v. Crolich, 101 F. Supp. 782, 784 (D. Ala. 1952).
157. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
158. The District Court for the Southern District of Alabama was particularly troubled by
this issue in the recent case of Chamberlain v. Alexander, 419 F. Supp. 235 (S.D. Ala. 1976).
The court there exempted a grand jury transcript from FOIA disclosure by holding that the
transcript qualified as an exempt investigatory record (5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1970)), but in so
holding said, "[i]nasmuch as the court ... finds the plaintiff is not entitled to disclosure of the
Grand Jury testimony on a factual basis, the court does not deem it wise nor necessary to
determine the effect of a possible conflict of FOIA and F.R. Crim.P. * 6(e) [sic]." 419 F. Supp.
at 239. The solution to the court's quandary is probably found in 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1970). Under
that statute, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, including rule 6(e), are proposed by the
Supreme Court and "adopted" by Congress. Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233, 241 (1973).
As such, rule 6(e) arguably qualifies as "statutorily exempt" from FOIA disclosures under 5
U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1970). Note, however, that this is merely an argument and is not patently
clear on the face of the statutes themselves. Obviously, then, it will be interesting to see how
the issue is resolved once a court is forced to squarely address it.
159. See text accompanying note 127 supra.
160. "The Fifth Circuit [in United States Steel] attached no significance to the fact that the
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jury witness? Full disclosure without regard to rule 6(e) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure would then presumably have been permitted,
since the rule of grand jury secrecy does not apply to grand jury witnesses
themselves. 
161
Fourth, what is being requested? In Sarbaugh, the plaintiff requested
transcripts of the testimony of particular grand jury witnesses.' 62 What if the
request had been for documents? Since the rule of grand jury secrecy applies
to documents as well as testimony presented to a grand jury, 163 a request for
documents would presumably have been treated no differently. What if,
however, the request had been for the actual grand jury minutes, showing
the deliberations of the grand jury itself? Such a request would seem to go
beyond the "need" to prepare for the testimony of particular witnesses
recognized as valid in Sarbaugh, and, presumably, would therefore fall
outside the scope of that decision.
Fifth, when is the request made? In Sarbaugh, several years had
elapsed between the time of the grand jury proceeding and the time of the
request. 16, What if the criminal case were still pending? The normal con-
siderations favoring grand jury secrecy would surely then have precluded
disclosure of the requested materials. 16 What if, however, the request had
been made shortly after the criminal case was closed but while the witnes-
ses' recollection of what they had said before the grand jury was still
"fresh"? An argument could then be made that the plaintiff could learn all
that it needed to know from the witnesses themselves, so that release of the
grand jury transcripts would add nothing.
Sixth, who already has copies of the material requested? In Sarbaugh,
the requested transcripts had been disclosed not only to the actual defendants
in the prior criminal proceeding but to a third party as well. 166 As already
noted, this additional disclosure distinguishes Sarbaugh from the Fifth
Circuit's conflicting holding in United States Steel. 167 Does this mean that
the Seventh Circuit might have decided the case differently had this addi-
tional disclosure not occurred? This, too, is a question that the court will no
doubt have to face if its decision is left standing by the Supreme Court.
materials were sought from the defendants in the civil case rather than the prosecutor in the
criminal case. Nor do we." 552 F.2d at 777 n.14.
161. Bast v. United States, 542 F.2d 893, 896 (4th Cir. 1976) ("[W]e recognize that Fed. R.
Crim. Pro. 6 imposes no condition of secrecy on the witness.
162. See text accompanytng note 127 supra.
163. United States v. Interstate Dress Carriers, Inc., 280 F.2d 52, 54 (2d Cir. 1960).
164. See text accompanying note 144 supra.
165. See note 139 supra.
166. See text accompanying note 141 supra.
167. See text accompanying note 150 supra.
ANTITRUST
STATE ACTION, EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION, AND
PRIMARY JURISDICTION: ANTITRUST DEFENSES
The Seventh Circuit considered two cases during the 1977 term which
involved the newly defined' 68 "state action exemption"' 169 to the antitrust
laws. Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway & Park District of Peoria 7 0 involved the
important question of when the state action exemption applies to actions of
local governmental units, as opposed to actions of the state itself. '7' City of
Mishawaka v. Indiana & Michigan Electric Co. 172 was doubly significant,
since it involved not only the scope of the state action exemption but the
question of when the "exclusive jurisdiction" and "primary jurisdiction"
doctrines apply to activities regulated in part by both state and federal
agencies.
Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway & Park District of Peoria:
Applicability of "State Action" Exemption to
Local Governmental Units
The plaintiffs in Kurek were five professionals who had been em-
ployed by the Peoria Park District to manage five municipal golf courses in
Peoria, Illinois. Each plaintiff had been granted the right by the park district
to operate a golf pro shop selling golf equipment at his golf course, for
which each paid the park district 1 1/2% of his gross receipts as a concession
fee. In the fall of 1973, the park district allegedly 7 3 devised the following
scheme to obtain greater revenues from its golf pro shop concessions. It
agreed with a company called Golf Shop Management' 74 that GSM would
submit a "sham" bid of $90,000 a year to the park district for the conces-
sion rights for all five golf courses. The park district then drew up public
168. See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341
(1943) (as clarified and narrowed in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975)).
169. Parker did not actually announce a rule of antitrust "exemption." It concluded,
rather, that Congress simply had not intended the Sherman Act to apply to state-required
actions. This article will use the term "exemption" as a short-hand reference to that determina-
tion.
170. 557 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1977), petition for cert. filed, No. 77-440 (U.S. Sept. 19, 1977).
171. See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 98 S.Ct. 1123 (1978). Unfortu-
nately, the decision in Louisiana Power & Light was reached too late to be incorporated into
this article. Suffice it to say, then, that the Court's plurality decision concluded "that the
Parker doctrine exempts only anticompetitive conduct engaged in as an act of government by
the State, as sovereign, or, by its subdivisions, pursuant to a state policy to displace competi-
tion with regulation or monopoly public service." Id. at 1137. That decision comports with the
reasoning in Kurek.
172. 1977-2 Trade Cas. 61,587 (7th Cir. 1977).
173. The case was before the Seventh Circuit on the plaintiffs' appeal from the lower
court's dismissal. In that posture, the Seventh Circuit assumed the truth of the "well-pleaded
facts alleged in the plaintiff's complaint." 557 F.2d at 584.
174. Hereinafter referred to in the text as GSM.
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bidding specifications for the purpose of entertaining bids, tailored exclu-
sively for GSM's bid. The park district, however, never formally met to
consider the bids. Rather, it attempted to use the GSM bid as a lever to
increase its revenues from the plaintiffs. Each plaintiff was instructed by the
park district that he should increase his prices for golf equipment by 5% and
that the concession rate would be raised from 1 1/2% to 5%. When the
plaintiffs refused to raise their prices, the park district cancelled their
concessions and awarded an exclusive concession to GSM.
175
The plaintiffs thereupon brought an antitrust action against the park
district, GSM and others, alleging in relevant part a conspiracy to fix the
retail prices of golf equipment at the five golf pro shops and to grant a
monopoly for the golf course concession to GSM. 176 The district court
dismissed the plaintiffs' antitrust claims as to the park district on the basis of
Parker v. Brown. 177 The claim as to GSM was also dismissed. 178 The
plaintiffs appealed from these rulings.
Kurek's Treatment of "State Action" Exemption
Since Kurek involved the activities of a municipal park district, the
court first considered whether the "state action exemption" protects the
activities of local, as opposed to state, governmental bodies. However,
175. 557 F.2d at 585-86.
176. Id. at 586.
177. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). See text accompanying note 179 infra.
178. The plaintiff's claim as to GSM was dismissed on the basis of Eastern R.R. President's
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961). This article will not discuss
GSM's asserted "Noerr defense." Some reference to the Seventh Circuit's treatment of this
issue is, however, warranted, since the issue is one that at least some practitioners may
similarly confront. Noerr involved allegations by the plaintiff trucker's association that the
defendant railroad association had mounted an extensive advertising campaign directed at
promoting legislation against the plaintiff. The Supreme Court held in Noerr that the defend-
ants' activities should not be subject to the antitrust laws for three reasons. First, the Court
stressed that the Sherman Act was not intended to regulate political activity, because there was
an "essential dissimilarity" between agreements usually held to be violative of the antitrust
laws and lobbying activity. Second, the flow of information to a governing body would be
impaired by a finding of antitrust liability for this type of activity. Finally, antitrust regulation
directed at lobbying activities would raise serious constitutional problems. The Court
concluded that such political activity should usually be exempt; however, it added that "there
may be situations in which a publicity campaign. . . directed toward influencing governmental
action, is a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere
directly with the business relationships of a competitor and the application of the Sherman Act
would be justified." Id. at 144.
In Kurek, the Seventh Circuit held that GSM's activities were not protected by Noerr. It
first noted that, unlike the lobbying activities in Noerr, GSM's activities in conspiring to fix
prices were not "essentially dissimilar" from the type of activity proscribed by the antitrust
laws. 557 F.2d at 593. Secondly, since the park district was not empowered to levy what
amounted to a sales tax, it did not have a need to obtain the information from GSM. Id. The
court additionally noted that it had trouble applying the constitutional right to petition the
government to GSM's activities. Id. at 593-94. Finally, the court reasoned that GSM's conces-
sion bid could, in any event, be viewed as a mere "sham," and clearly outside the scope of
Noerr. Id. at 594.
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before turning specifically to the Seventh Circuit's treatment of this issue, it
would be helpful to first summarize the general principles governing this
exemption, as laid down in the leading decisions of the Supreme Court.
Parker v. Brown179 involved a state-mandated program to prorate raisin
production in the state of California. The program had, in accordance with
state legislation, been adopted and enforced by a state agency after first
being devised and proposed to the agency by a group of raisin producers.
The Supreme Court upheld the program as a legitimate exercise of state
power, despite its obvious antitrust overtones. 180 The Court's reasoning was
that Congress, in enacting the Sherman Act, simply had not intended to
"restrain state action or official action directed by the state." '81 This
exclusion is what has loosely come to be referred to as the "state action
exemption. "
The Supreme Court's two most recent pronouncements on the state
action exemption have somewhat narrowed the scope of this doctrine.
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar182 involved a claimed defense of "state
action" on the part of the Virginia state bar association to a charge of price-
fixing involving the association's minimum fee schedules. The state bar
association had been established under the rules of the Supreme Judicial
Court of Virginia, but the judicial branch had not itself enacted rules
relevant to fee schedules. Rather, the state bar association had adopted, and
enforced, such fee schedules. The Supreme Court held that the state action
exemption was not applicable, since the state bar was engaging in an activity
not "compelled by direction of the State acting as a sovereign."1
8 3
The state action exemption was again examined by the Supreme Court
in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co. 84 In Cantor, an electric utility regulated by
the state of Michigan operated a program which provided "free" light bulb
service to electricity customers, the expense of the program being funded by
the general rates for the electricity. In its defense to a charge of illegal tying
of light bulbs to electricity, the utility contended that its light bulb program
was state-sanctioned because the general utility rate had to be approved by a
state regulatory agency. 185 The Supreme Court rejected that defense. 186 The
Court's majority, 8 7 while acknowledging that the state agency had ap-
proved the general rate, stressed that the agency's approval did not "imple-
179. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
180. Id. at 352.
181. Id. at 350-52.
182. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
183. Id. at 791.
184. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
185. Id. at 592.
186. Id. at 598.
187. The Court's opinion, written by Justice Stevens, was joined in whole by Justices
Brennan, White, and Marshall and in substantial part by Chief Justice Burger.
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ment any statewide policy relating to light bulbs," nor did the state policy
suggest that such a program should or should not be adopted. 188 Cantor, like
Goldfarb, thus found the "state action exemption" inapplicable to activities
that are not, in the words of Goldfarb, "compelled by direction of the
State." 1
89
In Kurek, the Seventh Circuit began its analysis of the Parker-Gold-
farb-Cantor exemption by emphasizing that those cases concerned state
activities, while Kurek involved the actions of a subordinate governmen-
tal unit.190 The court noted that the state action exemption can still be
invoked by a subordinate governmental unit, but only when the challenged
activities of the subordinate unit are mandated by the state, either through
explicit language in a state statute or through inference "from the nature of
the powers and duties given to a particular governmental entity.' 91 The
park district was empowered under the relevant state statute' 92 to maintain
golf courses, with the implicit power to contract for their maintenance. The
court held, however, that nothing in the implicit contractual power of the
park district or in the Illinois statutory provision could "even remotely
suggest that Illinois has authorized, let alone compelled, park districts to
attempt to enrich themselves by coercing horizontal retail competitors...
to fix retail prices . ''193 That conclusion was strengthened by the
plaintiffs' contention that the park district was, in effect, attempting to
impose a 5% sales tax on the golfing public of Peoria. Under the applicable
Illinois statutes, 194 such a sales tax would be beyond the power of the park
district, thus clearly establishing that the action was not mandated by the
state and, hence, not protected by the state action exemption.
The Seventh Circuit concluded that the state action exemption did not
support the district court's dismissal of the complaint and remanded the case
to the district court. As to the state officials named as defendants, the
Seventh Circuit noted that it might be possible for each of the officials to
establish a "good faith" defense, but that neither the facts nor legal
argument in support of such defenses were before the court.
City of Mishawaka v. Indiana & Michigan Electric Co.:
The Doctrines of Exclusive and Primary Jurisdiction
The state action exemption was again before the Seventh Circuit in the
188. 428 U.S. at 585.
189. See text accompanying note 183 supra.
190. 557 F.2d at 587-90.
191. Id. at 590 (quoting Duke & Co., Inc. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277 (3d Cir. 1975)).
192. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 105, §§ 8-1(a)-10, -16, 9.1-1 (1975).
193. 557 F.2d at 590.
194. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 105, §§ 6-1 to -6, 8-1(h) (1975).
ANTITRUST
case of City of Mishawaka v. Indiana & Michigan Electric Co. 19 In
addition, Mishawaka involved the scope of the doctrines of "exclusive"
and "primary jurisdiction," two doctrines developed by the courts to reduce
the friction that might otherwise result between judicial proceedings and the
regulatory activities of an administrative agency concerning a particular
matter. 196 As applied to antitrust law, the doctrine of exclusive jurisdiction
precludes the courts from applying the antitrust laws to activities which,
either expressly or by implication, have been statutorily "removed" from
antitrust scrutiny and "reserved" for exclusive treatment by a federal
agency. 197 The doctrine of primary jurisdiction has a lesser impact. With
respect to antitrust law, this doctrine simply stays an antitrust lawsuit on a
matter pending proceedings by an administrative agency on that same
matter.1 98 The court is not "ousted," however, from jurisdiction.
The essential facts of Mishawaka can be briefly summarized. Indiana
& Michigan Electric Co. 199 is a vertically integrated electric power company
which generates and markets electric power to wholesale and retail custom-
ers in Indiana and Michigan. The plaintiffs were municipal electric power
companies operating in Mishawaka, Indiana, that purchased electric power
wholesale from I & M and then competed with it in marketing the power to
retail customers. The plaintiffs found themselves caught in a "cost-price"
rate squeeze that threatened to drive them out of business when I & M began
charging them a wholesale rate higher than the retail rate it charged its
direct-buying retail customers. 2" However, the wholesale rate, after first
195. 1977-2 Trade Cas. 61,587 (7th Cir. 1977).
196. A further argument that could certainly have been in issue in Mishawaka, but which
the defendant apparently failed to raise, concerns the Supreme Court's decision in United Mine
Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). In Pennington, the Supreme Court
construed Noerr (See note 178 supra) as barring an antitrust suit based on an alleged conspiracy
between a labor union and a group of large employers to squeeze smaller employers out of the
industry by petitioning the Secretary of Labor to impose an unreasonably high wage require-
ment. In so holding, the Court said
Noerr shields from the Sherman Act a concerted effort to influence public officials
regardless of intent or purpose. . . . Joint efforts to influence public officials do not
violate the antitrust laws even though intended to eliminate competition. Such conduct
is not illegal, either standing alone or as part of a broader scheme itself violative of the
Sherman Act.
381 U.S. at 670. Taken literally, this language would seem to squarely apply to I & M's activity
in Mishawaka, i.e., petitions for rate determinations by public bodies. However, the Supreme
Court added in a footnote to Pennington that evidence of such a petition, if relevant, may
nevertheless be used to prove some other transaction subject to antitrust scrutiny. Id. at 670
n.3. Arguably, the rationale behind this footnote covers the situation in Mishawaka. Since the
activity in Mishawaka was directed at something outside the province of either the federal or
the state agencies, viz. the rate squeeze, Noerr, as interpreted in Pennington, does not apply.
197. See Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363 (1973); Pan Ameri-
can World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296 (1963).
198. See Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conference, 383 U.S. 213 (1966). See also
Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289 (1973).
199. Hereinafter referred to as I & M.
200. 1977-2 Trade Cas. 61,587 at 72,389.
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being formulated by I & M, had been approved by the Federal Power
Commission, while the retail rate, again after being formulated by I & M
itself, had been approved by state regulatory agencies.
20 1
The plaintiffs reacted by bringing an antitrust action against I & M
alleging monopolization and attempted monopolization in violation of sec-
tion 2 of the Sherman Act. 20 2 I & M moved to dismiss the complaint for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction or for failure to state a claim and, in the
alternative, to stay the proceeding pending a then on-going proceeding of
the Federal Power Commission involving a wholesale rate request made
after the filing of the lawsuit. 203 The case came to the Seventh Circuit on
interlocutory appeal after the district court denied I & M's motions.
20 4
I & M's challenge to the complaint involved a three-pronged attack that
blended the doctrines of state action, exclusive jurisdiction, and primary
jurisdiction. The retail rate, I & M argued, was exempt from antitrust
scrutiny under the state action exemption since expressly approved by state
regulatory bodies. 205 Similarly, the wholesale rate was protected from anti-
trust attack by the exclusive jurisdiction doctrine, since approved by the
Federal Power Commission. 206 In any event, the defendant further contend-
ed, antitrust proceedings should be stayed pending the on-going proceeding
of the Federal Power Commission, since the commission itself was sup-
posed to consider the "cost-price" squeeze when deciding upon the rea-
sonableness of a proposed wholesale rate.
207
The court's treatment of these issues is somewhat hazy. Nevertheless,
it seems to boil down to the following argument. Even assuming that the
state action and exclusive jurisdiction doctrines would have precluded a
direct attack on I & M's wholesale and retail rates, neither doctrine applied
to the rate squeeze, since this squeeze fell between and outside the effective
jurisdiction of each of the agencies involved. The state agencies could fix
the retail rates but could not control the interstate wholesale rates. 208 Simi-
201. Id. at 72,390.
202. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
203. 1977-2 Trade Cas. 61,587 at 72,390.
204. Id. at 72,391.
205. Id. at 72,390.
206. Id.
207. When the action was originally brought, the Commission was not required to consider
"cost-price" squeezes that might result from proposed wholesale rates. Rather, the Commis-
sion had simply inquired into whether the proposed wholesale rate was within a "zone of
reasonableness." After the district court in Mishawaka had handed down its opinion, however,
the Supreme Court specifically held that "cost-price squeezes" between wholesale and retail
rates should be considered by the Commission when setting the wholesale rates. Federal Power
Commission v. Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271 (1976). Since I & M had, subsequent to the
initiation of the Mishawaka lawsuit, petitioned the Commission for a new wholesale rate, I & M
argued that the issue of the squeeze would necessarily be dealt with by the Commission, so that
the court should at least stay its proceedings pending this agency action.
208. 1977-2 Trade Cas. 61,587 at 72,392.
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larly, even though the Federal Power Commission was supposed to consider
the retail rates when passing upon the wholesale rates, it still had to set the
wholesale rates within a "zone of reasonableness." To the extent that the
retail rates fell below this range, even the Commission was powerless to
eliminate the squeeze.20 9 Indeed, the only party with the effective power to
avoid the squeeze was I & M itself, since it had freely chosen to create the
problem in the first instance by submitting wholesale rates to the federal
agency that were higher than the retail rates submitted to the state agen-
cies.2 10 The rate squeeze, unlike the individual rates, was thus something
that fell outside the mandate of the respective agencies, making both the
state action and the exclusive jurisdiction doctrines inapplicable.
The court further bolstered its holding that the exclusive jurisdiction
doctrine did not apply by analogizing the state action case of Cantor v.
Detroit Edison Co. 211 to the doctrine of exclusive jurisdiction. The court
first interpreted Cantor as suggesting "two geneses to such an exemption:"
first, the unfairness of holding a private citizen liable for "conduct imposed
by the direct command of the sovereign;" and second, avoidance of a direct
clash between a particular application of the antitrust laws and a particular
regulatory scheme. 212 The court concluded that the first of these factors did
not apply, since the rate squeeze resulted from I & M's own actions and not
from an agency mandate. 21 3 With respect to the second factor, the court
noted that although the Commission has the power to fix rates for future
application, it cannot reopen the book on past rates, let alone award relief to
parties injured by past erroneous rates. 214 The court therefore concluded that
there was no apparent conflict between the plaintiffs' backward-directed
antitrust case and the Commission's forward-directed regulatory scheme.
2 15
Turning next to the question of primary jurisdiction, the court con-
sidered the following factors when deciding whether to stay the plaintiffs'
antitrust action pending completion of the Commission's on-going adminis-
trative action: avoiding possible inconsistencies between the antitrust action
and the Commission's regulatory scheme; the possibility that the Commis-
sion's findings might resolve the question of I & M's claimed antitrust
immunity; and the benefits to be gained by using the Commission's exper-
tise in resolving particular types of issues. 2 16 In holding that these factors did
209. Id.
210. Id. at 72,393.
211. 428 U.S. 579 (1976). See the discussion of Cantor in the text accompanying note 184
supra.
212. 1977-2 Trade Cas. 61,587 at 72,392.
213. See text accompanying note 210 supra.
214. 1977-2 Trade Cas. 61,587 at 72,393.
215. Id. at 72,392.
216. Id. at 72,394.
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not apply to the case, and that the Commission therefore did not have
primary jurisdiction, the court utilized essentially the same reasoning that it
had used to strike down the exclusive jurisdiction argument. It again noted
that the forward-directed thrust of the Commission's regulatory scheme is
not inconsistent with the type of relief the plaintiffs were seeking.21 7 Even if
the plaintiffs obtained damages and an injunction ordering I & M to end the
rate squeeze, this would simply mean that I & M would have to file a new
wholesale rate with the Commission. 218 Similarly, the court again noted that
the Commission's regulatory emphasis is on setting a "reasonable"
wholesale rate and not necessarily on avoiding a rate squeeze. 21 9 The
Commission's more limited expertise, therefore, would not "materially
advance the district court's fact-finding capacity or aid the district court's
determination of the extent of any possible antitrust immunity." 220 Primary
jurisdiction being inapplicable, the district court could continue its probe
into the matter.
Significance of Kurek and Mishawaka
Read together, Kurek and Mishawaka suggest three factors for prac-
titioners to consider when trying to develop, or defend, a case in which
regulatory action by a federal or state agency is arguably involved.
First, what type of agency is involved: federal or state? If the con-
cerned agency is a state agency, then the state action exemption may be an
issue in the case. If the agency is federal, the possibly relevant defenses
would be based on the doctrines of exclusive jurisdiction and primary
jurisdiction. Kurek and Mishawaka indicate that this distinction may,
however, be primarily a matter of labeling. Kurek noted that the state action
considerations in Cantor involved "factors akin to those used to determine
whether federal agency regulation of a business produces an implied anti-
trust immunity.'"221 Similarly, Mishawaka considered Cantor, a state ac-
tion case, at length in evaluating a claim of exclusive jurisdiction of a
federal agency. 222 Both Kurek and Mishawaka thus suggest that the doc-
trines are premised on similar bases.
Second, was the alleged anti-competitive activity commanded by the
regulatory agency or voluntarily entered into by the defendant? Kurek and
Mishawaka make it clear that if either the state action exemption or the
exclusive jurisdiction doctrine is to apply, the challeged activity, in the
words of Cantor, must have been "imposed by the direct command of the
217. Id. at 72,395.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 72,396.
221. 557 F.2d at 589.
222. See text accompanying note 211 supra.
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sovereign." If the challenged activity was instead something over which
the defendant itself had discretionary control, and which the concerned
agency did not or could not command it to do (for example, the "rate
squeeze" involved in Mishawaka), then neither doctrine will shield the
activity from antitrust scrutiny.
223
Third, is the regulatory agency actively engaged in regulating activities
of the type being challenged? In Mishawaka, the Seventh Circuit argued
that one of the bases under Cantor for implying an antitrust exemption is
'that Congress may not have intended to superimpose the antitrust laws as
an additional-and potentially conflicting-regulatory scheme, if the
concerned state or federal agency is actively engaged in regulating the
area. 224 Mishawaka emphasized that this potential conflict does not exist
when the regulatory agency's remedial powers cannot fully protect the rights
of the injured parties. It is therefore critical to ask just what the agency can
and cannot do, as well as what it has actually chosen to do, in implementing
its regulatory scheme. If the challenged activity falls within an area express-
ly or impliedly reserved by state law to a state regulatory agency, and that
agency has actually "commanded" the activity, then the state action ex-
emption will apply. Similarly, if federal legislation expressly or impliedly
places the matter within the regulatory power of a federal agency, and the
agency has shown an actual willingness to exercise that power, 225 then the
doctrine of exclusive jurisdiction will apply. Finally, if the matter is one
which may be reached by an on-going proceeding of a federal regulatory
agency, so that the agency may either itself resolve the matter or at least
provide administrative expertise useful to the judiciary in handling the
problem, then the doctrine of primary jurisdiction will apply. If, however,
the matter is one over which the concerned agency has no effective power,
none of these doctrines will be applicable.
CONCLUSION
Several antitrust cases were before the Seventh Circuit during its 1977
session. This article has discussed the more significant of these decisions,
involving the following quite diverse substantive and procedural issues: (1)
223. See text accompanying notes 208-210 supra. Note, however, the possible applicability
of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine where the defendant, having such discretionary control over
the activity, has petitioned a government agency to approve part of all of the activity. See notes
178 and 196 supra.
224. See text accompanying note 212 supra.
225. See Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659 (1975). In Gordon, the Court
implied that an important factor in determining the applicability of the exclusive jurisdiction
doctrine is the regulatory agency's willingness to exercise its power as demonstrated through
the agency's actions.
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definition of a "relevant product market" for merger and monopolization
cases; 226 (2) respondents' right to withdraw from consent orders and consent
decrees in actions brought by the Federal Trade Commission or the Justice
Department;2 27 (3) definition of the "interstate commerce" jurisdictional
requirement of the Sherman Act; 228 (4) venue over foreign parent corpora-
tions based upon activities of their local subsidiaries; 229 (5) plaintiffs' right
to obtain grand jury transcripts for use in private treble damages actions;
230
(6) definition of the "state action" doctrine;231 (7) definition of the "exclu-
sive jurisdiction" doctrine; 23 2 (8) definition of the "primary jurisdiction"
doctrine.
233
Each of the issues has been approached from the pragmatic standpoint
of how best to help the practitioner. Thus, the discussion of each of these
issues closes with a list of probing questions and answers that antitrust
practitioners will hopefully find helpful in making more effective use of the
law as it now stands in the Seventh Circuit.
226. See text beginning at note 3 supra.
227. See text beginning at note 44 supra.
228. See text beginning at note 82 supra.
229. Id.
230. See text beginning at note 123 supra.
231. See text beginning at note 169 supra.
232. Id.
233. Id.
